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546 Michigan Law Review 
"Imminent Danger of Addiction" as a Ground for 
Involuntary Commitment in California-
People v. Victor* 
[Vol, 64 
Since the passage of the Harrison Act1 in 1914, the principal 
means of controlling drug addiction in the United States have been 
rigid controls on importation and domestic production of narcotics, 
and increasingly heavy penal sanctions for the illegal possession or 
• 42 Cal. Rptr. 199, 398 P.2d 391 (Sup. Ct. 1965). 
I. 38 Stat. 785 (1914) (now INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 4701-36). For the background 
of the act, see ELDRIDGE, NARCOTICS AND ,THE LAw 7.9 (1962) [hereinafter cited as 
ELDRIDr.E]; LINDESMim, THE ADDICT AND THE LAW 3-34 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 
LINDESMITII]. 
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sale of addicting drugs. Effective as these measures have been in 
restricting the domestic traffic in narcotics and driving up the price 
of illegal drugs, long prison sentences have not been successful in 
either deterring or curing drug addiction.2 Recognizing the unique 
psychological and physiological aspects of addiction, the United 
States Public Health Service established hospitals in the 1930's at 
Lexington, Kentucky, and Fort Worth, Texas, offering medical treat-
ment to addicts in federal prisons and to others voluntarily request-
ing admission.3 The two hospitals have had notoriously poor results 
in effecting permanent abstinence from drugs.4 Their failure has 
been attributed largely to• the lack of supervision over the patients 
after release and to the premature release of many volunteer patients 
who leave against medical advice.5 
Medical opinion is sharply diyided as to the wisdom of the 
present prohibitionary attitude toward narcotics control. A number 
of medical authorities argue that controlled amounts of narcotics 
should be made available to addicts through out-patient clinics and 
that the addict should be forced to terminate his "habit" only when 
considered psychologically capable of resisting the temptation to 
resume the use of drugs.6 They contend that this approach would 
2. It has been estimated that there were two million narcotics addicts in this 
country prior to the imposition of the Harrison Act controls in 1914. ELDRIDGE 7 n.27. 
Although it is now officially estimated that this number has been reduced to fifty 
thousand, other estimates of current addiction run as high as one million. Compare 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON NARCOTIC AND DRUG ABUSE 27 
(1962) (hereinafter cited as 1962 CONFERENCE] with SCHUR, NARCOTIC ADDICTION' IN 
BRITAIN AND AMERICA 44 (1962) (hereinafter cited as SCHUR]. The problem of narcotics 
addiction is greatest in New York, Illinois, California, and Michigan. ELDRIDGE 50. 
For a description of the enforcement of present narcotics laws, see LINDESMITH 35-62. 
3. See Act of January 19, 1929, 45 Stat. 1085. Although federal prisoners make up 
60% of the population of the Lexington facility, 90% of the 3,500 annual admissions 
to the hospital are voluntary. The prisoner population of the hospital represents 
only a small proportion of the total number of known addicts in the federal prison 
system. O'Donnell, The Lexington Program for Narcotic Addicts, Fed. Prob., March 
1962, p. 55. 
4. 1962 CONFERENCE 92-93. 
5. Ibid. Estimates of the rate of relapse among patients released from the Lexington 
hospital are as high as 95%. Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 67 on the Causes, Treatment, 
and Rehabilitation of Drug Addicts Before the Subcommittee on Improvements in 
the Federal Criminal Code of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 
1st Sess., pt. 5, 1372 (1955): Berger, Dealing With Drug Addiction, A Reply to Mr. Kuh, 
in U.S. BUREAU OF NARCOTICS, TREASURY DEP'T., CONTROL AND REHABILITATION OF THE 
NARCOTIC ADDICT 13 (1961). See generally ELDRIDGE 30-32. 
6. Such a plan is outlined in detail in New York Academy of Medicine, Report on 
Drug Addiction, 31 BULL. N.Y. ACADEMY OF MEDICINE 592 (1955). Cf. LINDESMITH 
269-302; 1962 CONFERENCE 114. Between 1919 and 1925, 44 clinics were opened to 
make narcotics legally available to addicts under medical supervision. Alleged abuses 
in these programs forced their termination. See ANSLINGER &: TOMPKINS, THE TRAFFIC 
IN NARCOTICS 191-206 (1953). Compare LINDESMITH 135-61. The proposed system of 
out-patient clinics is similar to the treatment of addicts in Britain. See SCHUR passim. 
Under the present state of the law, a physician is not forbidden to prescribe 
narcotics for an addict, either during withdrawal distress or in the course of other 
treatment. In early cases involving indiscriminate prescription of large quantities of 
548 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 64 
undermine the present illegal drug traffic and allow greater flexi-
bility in the treatment of addicts. Opponents of this approach con-
tend that it would be ineffective, since past experience has shown that 
a parallel traffic in illegal drugs would continue, supported by addicts 
whose desire is not satisfied by the quantity of narcotics they can 
obtain legally.7 It is also feared that underworld bosses, unwilling to 
relinquish their profits from the narcotics traffic, would actively seek 
to develop new markets for their product by encouraging addiction 
in young perso~s. The weight of medical opinion appears to support 
the attempt to control narcotics addiction through compulsory 
abstinence, provided that a program of post-withdrawal supervision 
and rehabilitation is available.8 
In 1959 California initi_ated a pilot program which established 
the value of institutionalizing the drug addict for a limited period 
so as to provide both medical treatment during the often intense 
illness which accompanies withdrawal from narcotic drugs, and a 
rehabilitation program of psychiatric counseling and vocational 
training. The period of institutionalization was followed by closely 
supervised out-patient treatment, during which specially-trained 
state parole officers provided continued counseling, job placement 
advice, and aid to the addict's family, in an effort to facilitate re-
entry into the community.9 In 1961 the California legislature added 
provisions to the state penal code adopting the treatment procedures 
developed in the pilot project and authorizing the establishment of 
a special rehabilitation center to administer the in-patient phase of 
drugs, the United States Supreme Court indicated that the Harrison Act restricted 
medical use of narcotics to cases in which the life of the addict was in danger. This 
position was later abandoned by the Court. Compare Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 
96 (1919), with Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5 (1925). However, the Federal Bureau 
of Narcotics bas refused to recognize the Linder doctrine in enforcing the Harrison 
Act. U.S. Bur,;au of Narcotics, Treasury Dep't., Prescribing and Dispensiug of Nar-
cotics Under the Harrison Narcotic Law, Pamphlet No. 56 (1960), Under the threat 
of prosecution and the pressure of public opinion generated by the Bureau, the medical 
profession has largely abdicated its discretion in the treatment of addicts, LINDE-
SMITH 13. 
7. CAUFORNIA SPECIAL STUDY COMMISSION ON NARCOTICS, FINAL REPORT 95-98 (1961), 
See ANSUNGER 8: TOMPKINS, op. cit. supra note 6, at 185-91. 
It is interesting to note that the strongest support for maintainir.g the status 
quo in the handling of addicts comes from those involved in the administration of 
present treatment and drug control programs. Because of the inflexible posture of 
law enforcement agencies, empirical data are not available to verify the asserted 
superiority of compulsory abstinence over other proposed methods of treating addicts. 
8. See, e.g., 1962 CONFERENCE 295-301. Voluntary organizations such as Addicts 
Anonymous and Synanon have been recognized as effective aids to post-withdrawal· 
rehabilitation. See MAURER 8: VOGEL, NARCOTICS AND NARCOTIC Aoo1cr10N 178 (2d ed. 
1962); Yablonsky, The Anticriminal Society-Synanon, Fed. Prob., Sept, 1962, p. 50. 
9. BURKHART 8: SATHMARY, CALIFORNIA NARCOTIC TREATMENT-CONTROL PROJECT 
PHASES I AND II (1963). This project grew out of a preliminary study of the problem, 
CmZENS' ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE ATIORNEY GENERAL ON CRIME PREVENTION, 
NARCOTIC ADDICTION, REPoRT TO THE ATIORNEY GENERAL (1954) (Cal.). 
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the program.10 Admission to the rehabilitation center is either volun-
tary11 or the result of an involuntary civil commitment proceeding.12 
When it appears that a convicted criminal defendant is the victim 
of narcotics, the judge in the criminal action is authorized to suspend 
sentencing and to direct that involuntary civil commitment pro-
ceedings be instituted. If the commitment hearing results in a 
finding that the defendant is "a narcotic addict, or by reason of re-
peated use of narcotics is in imminent danger of becoming ad-
dicted, "18 the defendant may be committed to the rehabilitation 
facilities for a period not to exceed ten years.14 If such a finding is 
not made, or, if the finding is made, upon release from the rehabili-
tation program, the defendant is still subject to sentencing on the 
.criminal charge. However, all time spent in the rehabilitation pro-
gram is credited against the sentence.15 
In People v. Victor16 the California Supreme Court was presented 
for the first time with a challenge to the constitutionality of the in-
voluntary civil commitment of a convicted criminal defendant found 
to be "in imminent danger of becoming addicted." In prior cases, 
beginning with In re De La 0,11 the California court had upheld 
the constitutionality of the statute as applied to defendants who had 
been committed after having been found to be actually addicted 
to narcotics. In these cases the principal ground of attack had been 
that civil commitment was sufficiently similar to penal confinement 
to constitute cruel and unusual punishment, forbidden by the four-
teenth amendment.18 The court, in rejecting this argument, had 
IO. Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 850, §§ 2, 3, as amended, CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 6399-6555. 
Descriptions of the administration of these provisions are found in 1962 CONFERENCE 
101-09; Wood, New Program Offers Hope for Addicts, Fed. Prob., Dec. 1964, p. 41. 
Massachusetts and New York have recently adopted legislation similar to the Cali-
fornia provisions. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 17, § 12; ch. 111A, §§ 1-10 (Supp. 1964); 
N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §§ 200-216. The New York program is discussed in DIS• 
KIND & KLONSKY, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TREATMENT OF PAROLED OFFENDERS 
ADDlcrED TO NARCOTIC DRUGS (1964); Kuh, Civil Commitment for Narcotic Addicts, 
Fed. Prob., June 1963, p. 21. As a practical matter, involuntary hospitalization of 
addicts is frequently accomplished without enabling legislation. Law enforcement 
agencies may give an arrested person the choice of seeking voluntary admission to 
treatment centers or facing prosecution. MAURER & VOGEL, op. cit. supra note 8, at 
176. The wisdom, not to mention the legality, of this procedure is questionable. 
See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 31 (1961). 
11. CAL. PEN. CODE § 6500. 
12. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 6450-51, 6500. 
13. CAL. PEN. CODE § 6450. 
14. CAL. PEN. CODE § 6521. Post-conviction commitment is normally not available 
to addicts found guilty of certain felonies. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 6452, 6450. 
15. CAL. PEN. CODE § 6520. 
16. 42 Cal. Rptr. 199, 398 P.2d 391 (Sup. Ct. 1965). 
17. 59 Cal. 2d 128, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489, 378 P.2d 793, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 856 
(1963). Accord, In re Trummer, 60 Cal. 2d 658, 36 Cal. Rptr. 281, 388 P.2d 177 (1964); 
In re Johnson, 59 Cal. 2d 644, 30 Cal. Rptr. 819, 381 P.2d 643 (1963); In re Raner, 
59 Cal. 2d 635, 30 Cal. Rptr. 814, 381 P.2d 638 (1963); In re Butler, 59 Cal. 2d 157, 
28 Cal. Rptr. 508, 378 P.2d 812, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 11 (1963). 
18. CJ. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
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held that the extensive individual treatment provided for addicts in 
the California Rehabilitation Center and while on parole clearly in-
dicated the nonpenal-nature of civil commitment under the statute.10 
In De La O, the petitioner also contended that the operative term, 
"addict," was unconstitutionally vague. This contention was likewise 
rejected, on the ground that the word is nontechnical and, when 
accorded "the approved usage of the language," is not objectionably 
vague.20 
In Victor, the defendant contended that the statute was uncon-
stitutionally vague in not providing an ascertainable standard of the 
imminency of addiction sufficient to support commitment.21 Al-
though the commitment order was reversed on statutory grounds,22 
the court, in the interest of certainty in the administration of the 
19. See cases cited note 17 supra. But see LINDESMITII 290-93. 
20. ln"re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d 128, 153, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489, 505, 378 P.2d 793, 809 
(1963). "Narcotic addict" is defined in the statute as "any person, whether adult or 
minor, who is addicted to the unlawful use of any narcotic." CAL. PEN, CODE § 6407. 
For a compilation of other legislative efforts at defining narcotic addiction, see 
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, op. cit. supra note 10, at 82-86. 
21. This problem had also bothered earlier student commentators. Sec Note, 1 
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 58, 74 (1964); 8 UTAH L. REv. 367 (1963-64). 
22. The defendant in Victor had been subjected to a commitment hearing after 
having begun a six-month criminal sentence. The commitment order was reversed on 
the ground that although the statute provides for involuntary commitment before 
sentencing or when the person is not charged with a crime, it docs not. authorize 
commitment while the person is actually serving a sentence. People v. Victor, 42 Cal. 
Rptr. 199, 207, 398 P.2d 391, 399 (Sup. Ct. 1965). California courts have consistently 
required strict adherence to the statutory commitment procedures. See cases cited 
note 17 supra. See also People for the Best Interest of Nelson, 218 Cal. App. 2d 441, 
32 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1963); Van Zanten v. Superior Court, 214 Cal. App. 2d 510, 29 
Cal. Rptr. 625 (1963). Cf. People v. Perez, 198 Cal. App. 2d 460, 18 Cal. Rptr. 164 
(1961); In re Hofmann, 131 Cal. App. 2d 758, 281 P.2d 96 (1955); In the Matter of 
Crowley, 95 Cal. App. 219, 272 Pac. 787 (1928). The rationale behind the narrow 
construction is twofold. First, since civil commitment was not available at common 
law but is a power conferred by statute, the courts have held that the statutory pro• 
visions must be closely· followed in order to create jurisdiction. Second, in California 
due process requires a hearing prior to commitment. In the Matter of Lambert, 134 
Cal. 626, 66 Pac. 851 (1901); accord, In re Wellman, 3 Kan. App. 100, 45 Pac. 726 
(1896); State ex rel. Blaisdell v. Billings, 55 Minn. 467, 57 N.W. 794 (1894); State 
ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax, 364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W.2d 72 (1954); People ex rel, Sullivan 
v. Wendel, 33 Misc. 496, 68 N.Y. Supp. 948 (Sup. Ct. 1900). Contra, Hammon v. Hill, 
228 Fed. 999 (W.D. Pa. 1915); Payne v. Arkebauer, 190 Ark. 614, 80 S.W.2d 76 (1935); 
Hiatt v. Soucek, 240 Iowa 300, 36 N.W.2d 432 (1949); In re Dowdell, 169 Mass. 387, 
47 N.E. 1033 (1897) (all holding constitutional ex parte commitment orders where 
habeas corpus proceedings were available to test the validity of the original commit• 
ment). The California courts have stressed the importance of allowing the defendant 
to remain at liberty to facilitate his preparation for the commitment hearing, Cf. In re 
Raner, 59 Cal. 2d 635, 30 Cal. Rptr. 814, 381 P.2d 638 (1963); In re Hofmann, supra. 
It should be noted that the objection is mitigated by the defendant's right to counsel 
paid by the state. CAL._ WELFARE & INST'Ns CODE § 5054; CAL. PEN. CODE § 6505. In 28 
states, counsel is not available as a matter of right to defendants in commitment 
proceedings. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, op. cit.· supra note 10, at 29, Even if due 
process did not require the result reached in the principal case, a contrary holding 
would raise equal protection problems. Cf. In re Trummer, 60 Cal. 2d 658, 36 Cal. 
Rptr. 281, 388 P.2d 177 (1964). 
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statute, considered- the constitutional attack. Displaying unusual 
judicial ability to deal with medical concepts, the court found that 
the psychological and physiological symptoms of addiction suggested 
a test for "imminent danger" which both achieved the purposes of 
the statute and met the vagueness objection. Medical authorities 
recognize three primary characteristics of addiction: habituation, an 
emotional compulsion to experience the sense of well-being created 
by narcotics; tolerance, the gradually developed resistance to the 
effects of the drugs, causing the addict to require increasingly large 
doses of narcotics to achieve the same effect; and physical depen-
dence, the occurrence of withdrawal sickness when the use of nar-
cotics is terminated.28 Considering these characteristics, the court 
recognized that a person is not "in imminent danger of becoming 
addicted" after having merely experimented with the use of drugs, 
nor by reason of occasional use of drugs for personal gratification 
or under social pressure.24 Rather, as the statute explicitly requires, 
the "imminent danger of becoming addicted" intended as a ground 
for commitment is the danger arising from the "repeated use of 
narcotics."21i The court therefore indicated that involuntary com-
mitment under the imminent-danger test must be limited to persons 
in whom the repeated use of narcotics is gradually causing normal 
adaptive behavior to be replaced by emotional reliance on drugs, 
but who have not developed the tolerance, the withdrawal syndrome, 
and the complete psychological dependence characteristic of narcotic 
addiction.26 
The defendant in Victor also questioned the constitutionality 
of extending the police power of the state so as to permit involuntary 
confinement of persons not actually afflicted with the disease of 
drug addiction but only in danger of becoming so afflicted. Con-
cluding that a constitutional defect might exist if the statute were 
construed to allow the commitment of persons suffering only from 
a psychological predisposition to addiction, the court felt that the 
provision making the repeated use of narcotics a prerequisite to a 
23. This widely accepted description of addiction was first proposed by the World 
Health Organization. ELDRIDGE 2, n.l. See, e.g., MAURER 8: VOGEL, op. cit. supra note 
8, at 32. In addition, the court recognized the importance of learning through experi-
ence in the process leading to addiction, as the narcotics user first experiences the 
adaptive effects of the drug, and later learns of the illness he incurs when his intake 
of drugs is reduced. It has been suggested that this is the most scientific explanation 
of addiction possible. SCHUR 40. See LINDESMITH, OPIATE ADDlCTION (1947). 
24. Empirical studies of drug addicts in this country have pointed to common 
personality and psychological factors that suggest it may be possible to predict the 
likelihood of addiction in an individual. See, e.g., Ploscowe, Some Basic Problems in 
Drug Addiction and Suggestions for Research, in JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE A.B.A. 
AND THE A.M.A. ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, DRUG ADDICTION-CRIME OR DISEASE? 50-64 (1961). 
However, other writers have questioned the existence of any identifiable psychopathic 
predisposition to addiction. SCHUR passim. 
25. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 6450-51, 6500. 
26. People v. Victor, 42 Cal. Rptr. 199, 214-15, 398 P.2d 391, 406-07 (Sup. Ct, 1965). 
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finding of "imminent danger" brought the statute within' the-
police power of the state. This conclusion was based on a question-
able analogy to sexual psychopath laws, which authorize the civil 
commitment of persons predisposed, by reason of mental defects, 
to the commission of sexual offenses. The United States Supreme 
Court has upheld a sexual psychopath statute construed by the state 
court as requiring evidence of actual prior sexual misconduct.27 
Nevertheless, the mere fact that involuntary civil commitment is 
based on prior physical acts is not alone sufficient to bring it within 
the police power of the state. 
Civil commitment is a proper exercise of the police power when 
the state is acting either to protect the community or, as parens 
patriae, the individual committed.28 However, since civil commit-
ment involves a deprivation of liberty without many of the proce-
dural safeguards available in a criminal prosecution,20 courts have 
required, as a prerequisite to civil commitment, that the person 
committed be utterly lacking in capacity to control his dangerous 
propensities.3° Civil commitment is indistinguishable from criminal 
prosecution when applied to an individual who has the power to 
control his anti-social tendencies, even if he shows no desire to utilize 
that power.81 An additional prerequisite to the exercise of the 
police power is that the danger to the individual or the community 
on which the exercise is based must be actual, not merely theoret-
ical.s2 
It is highly questionable whether either justification for the use 
of the police power-protection of the individual or of society-is 
present when the addiction is only "imminent." It does not appear 
that the interests of the individual justify the exercise, through civil 
commitment proceedings, of the parens patriae power of the state 
27. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940), affirming 205 
Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297 (1939). The Court in Pearson did not deal with the limits 
of the police power. The prior sexual misconduct Tequired as a prerequisite to 
involuntary commitment was considered important only in answer to the asserted 
unconstitutional vagueness of the statute. But cf. Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F,2d 
852 (D.C. Cir. 1961). 
28. See, e.g., Porter v. Ritch, 70 Conn. 235, 39 Atl. 169 (1898) (protection of public): 
State ex rel. Larkin v. Ryan, 70 Wis. 676, 36 N.W. 823 (1888) (Parens patriae), The 
police power has been exercised to confine insane persons, inebriates, sexual psycho• 
paths, juvenile delinquents, defective delinquents, and narcotics addicts. 8 UTAH L. 
REv. 367, 370 (1963-64). 
29. See, e.g., In re Keddy, 105 Cal. App. 2d 215, 233 P.2d 159 (1951) (no protection 
against double jeopardy); People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N.W.2d 18 (1942) 
(no protection against ex post facto commitment). See generally Kadish, A Case Study 
in the Signification of Procedural Due Process-Institutionalizing the Mentally Ill, 
9 WESTERN POLITICAL Q. 93 (1956); 8 UTAH L. REv. 367 (1963-64). 
30. E.g., State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 205 Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297 (1989), 
aff d, 309 U.S. 270 (1940). 
31. Cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
32. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
January 1966] Recent Developments 553 
before actual addiction is reached. Unlike the alcoholic, the user 
of narcotics experiences no permanent deleterious physical or mental 
effects from his habit.88 Moreover, there is no evidence that the re-
habilitation of a narcotics user is more successful if initiated before 
total addiction is reached. Indeed, it has been suggested that once 
a withdrawal from narcotics has been experienced, the fear of ever 
having to repeat the process is a powerful factor in discouraging 
recidivism.84 Neither does it appear that a person taking narcotics, 
even though he is "in imminent danger of becoming addicted," 
is a threat to society. Although addicts frequently resort to criminal 
activity to obtain money to support their habit, there is no indication 
of any such tendency on the part of drug users who are not yet under 
the compulsion symptomatic of narcotics addiction.35 Likewise, al-
though anyone using narcotics has necessarily been in unlawful 
possession of the drug used, and has probably been a party to an 
illegal sale of narcotics, these are comparatively minor infractions 
and should be dealt with as such. It is doubtful whether either of 
these actions is sufficiently injurious to society to justify a long-
term commitment under the police power. 
Even if it is assumed arguendo that the user of narcotics is a 
danger to society and to himself, involuntary commitment of the 
noncompulsive narcotics user is nevertheless an unprecedented ex-
tension of civil confinement into areas in which criminal procedural 
safeguards have traditionally been required.86 The involuntary com-
mitment of sexual psychopaths is analogous to the civil commitment 
of actual narcotics addicts, in that both types of individuals have 
demonstrated an inability to control their anti-social acts.87 However, 
under the Victor test for "imminent danger,"88 involuntary commit-
ment is extended one step further back along the chain of causation, 
to a point where it is not yet certain that the individual will develop 
a condition by reason of which he is likely to represent a danger to 
society. The only justification for commitment prior to addiction is 
that early treatment may obviate the dangers which result if the 
defendant eventually becomes addicted. The laudable intent indi-
cated by the statutory provisions, however, does not mitigate the 
danger to individual freedom. 
The California post-conviction commitment provisions and the 
extensive treatment and rehabilitation provided thereunder would 
seem to be a rational and effective approach to the problem of 
33. ELDRIDGE 16-18; SCHUR 22; Medical Views on the Narcotics Problem, 31 
F.R.D. 53, 93 (1961). 
34. Cf. MAURER 8e VOGEL, op. cit. supra note 8, at 83, 178. 
35. Cf. SCHUR 138. 
36. See 8 UTAH L. R.Ev. 367 (1963-64). 
37. Cf. Ploscowe, supra note 24, at 64-68. 
38, See text accompanying note 26 supra. 
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actual narcotics addiction. 0 The detailed analysis of addiction in
Victor establishes medically valid criteria for subsequent judicial
administration of criminal and civil regulation of addiction.40 How-
ever, the extensive dicta in the Victor opinion, upholding the in-
voluntary commitment of persons not yet addicted to narcotics,
indicate approval of an extension of civil commitment into an area
currently protected by criminal procedural safeguards. Should the
court actually be called upon to decide the question, proper con-
sideration of the threat to individual liberty may require that the
procedure be held violative of due process.
39. But see LINDESMITH 290-93.
40. Cf. People v. O'Neil, 44 Cal. Rptr. 320, 401 P.2d 928 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (con-
struing statute making driving an automobile while addicted a felony).
